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external causal agent (e.g., a parent, a teacher, economic disadvantages) are more likely to get angry and thus lash out
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INTRODUCTION
General strain theory (GST) has motivated dozens of
criminological studies over the past two decades. The
developer of GST, Robert Agnew, considered versions of
Merton’s, Cloward and Ohlin’s, and Cohen’s strain
theories, melded them with innovative concepts from
contemporary criminological and social-psychological
research, and crafted a new theoretical model of delinquent
and criminal behavior. In particular, he re-envisioned this
model to emphasize three types of strain and their
influence on negative emotionality and delinquency. The
three forms of strain addressed by GST are (1) the failure
to achieve positively valued goals, (2) the removal of
positively valued stimuli, and (3) the presentation of
negative stimuli (Agnew 1992). Delinquency results when
these strains are interpreted as unjust, high in magnitude,
associated with low social control, and have created some
pressure to engage in criminal coping (Agnew 2001).
Moreover, a key emotion that links strain with delinquency
is anger. Anger “increases the individual’s feelings of
injury, creates a desire for retaliation/revenge, energizes
the individual for action, and lowers inhibitions,” resulting
in a sense that maladaptive behaviors, particularly

delinquency, aggression, or violence, are justified (Agnew
1992:60). Feelings of anger motivate adolescents to
attempt to defend or recover valued stimuli through
delinquent actions (Brezina 1996) and may also be aroused
through a threat to autonomy, which youths then attempt to
reestablish through illicit means (Brezina 2000).
An important issue mentioned briefly in Agnew’s
seminal GST article involves under what circumstances
strain leads to anger and delinquency. Although various
coping mechanisms – such as high self-esteem, selfefficacy, self-control, or social support – may alleviate the
likelihood of anger, a key factor that increases this
negative emotion is when youths blame other people for
stressful situations: “Anger results when individuals blame
their adversity on others” (Agnew 1992:59). Presumably,
this implies that adolescents who blame strain on an
external cause (e.g., a parent, a teacher, economic
disadvantages) are more likely to get angry and thus lash
out through delinquent acts. Yet it also suggests that when
the cause of strain is not attributed to others, adolescents
do not tend to become angry and thus do not engage in
delinquent behavior. Other negative emotions might occur,
such as despair or dysphoria, but these will most likely
result in depressive symptoms, anxiety, or feelings of
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sadness. In general, then, externalizing blame is the key
moderating variable in GST.
It is peculiar to note, however, that many studies of
GST have addressed the three types of strain, as well as
anger and coping resources such as self-esteem, selfefficacy, self-control, and social support (e.g., Agnew
1997, 2001, 2006a; Agnew et al. 2002; Agnew and White
1992; Broidy 2001; Froggio, Zamaro, and Lori 2009;
Hoffmann 2009; Hoffmann and Miller 1998; Hoffmann
and Su 1997; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Piquero, GomezSmith, and Langton 2004; Rebellon et al. 2009; Tittle,
Broidy, and Gertz 2008), but there have been few, if any,
attempts to study causal attributions even though this
mechanism is fundamental to GST and earlier forms of
strain theory. Whereas the notion of attributions appears
briefly in Agnew’s writings, it also has a central role in
Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) strain model (see Hoffmann
and Ireland 1995). Yet it is perhaps best known to
criminologists due to the work of Sykes and Matza (1957),
who argued that delinquent behavior is often “neutralized”
by attributing the causal factors to others or to
uncontrollable events in youths’ lives.
We argue that this is a serious, perhaps fatal, omission
on the part of general strain theorists and researchers.
Ignoring a fundamental mechanism of GST has likely led
not only to underfit empirical models that have yielded
biased coefficients, but also to a stagnant understanding of
how strain might affect delinquency. In particular, it may
explain why research has produced such inconsistent
empirical results when it comes to whether anger affects
the association between strain and delinquency (cf. Agnew
et al. 2002; Aseltine, Gore, and Gordon 2000; Mazerolle et
al. 2000; Tittle et al. 2008). As we discuss later,
understanding who one blames for strain-related
experiences is essential to identifying whether anger and,
consequently, delinquency ensue. Yet, as we also show in
the subsequent discussion, the concept of externalization
of blame and the more general category of attributions are
sorely underdeveloped in criminological theory in general
and in GST in particular.
In this paper, we attempt to overcome the lack of
attention to these issues in research on GST by elaborating
how causal attributions are a key moderating mechanism
for understanding the links between strain, anger, and
delinquency. Following a review of some of the early
influences on GST, we discuss recent research on
attribution theory – in particular, models of how people
interpret the situations they experience – to elaborate how
strain may require specific forms of external attributions in
order to result in anger and, ultimately, aggressive and
delinquent behavior. We contend that it is not so much
whether some experience that is, perhaps, objectively
labeled strain occurs, but how it is interpreted by the
adolescent. The interpretation of experiences is acutely
influenced by whether the adolescent exhibits an
attributional style that identifies other people as causing
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the experience as opposed to causal factors such as fate,
luck, or personal characteristics. We also propose that
hostile attribution bias – which is the tendency to interpret
hostile intent on the part of others during what seem to
observers as ambiguous social interactions (e.g., Dodge
2006) – is a promising concept for clarifying these
linkages.

THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF GENERAL STRAIN
THEORY
As mentioned earlier, Agnew’s strain model is a
systematic amalgamation of sociological and socialpsychological notions about the effects of negative
experiences on humans. Although the sociological sources
include work by Merton and Cohen, for our purposes an
important model in the development of GST is due to
Cloward and Ohlin (1960). This is because they
emphasized most clearly the role of attributions of blame.1
In their study of delinquency and opportunity, they
proposed that one type of strain leads to delinquency
primarily when youths blame their adverse experiences on
others. Known generally as externalization of blame, this
condition was assumed to be a crucial element to their
early form of strain theory (Hoffmann and Ireland 1995).
In particular, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that those
who externalize blame by interpreting their adverse
situations with reference to external social factors – such
as others, but also on their proximate social environment –
are likely to become alienated, withdraw legitimacy from
conventional social norms, and find alternative means to
gain valued resources. These alternative means typically
involve delinquent behavior.
The social-psychological sources of strain theory are
found primarily in two related models. First, the
frustration-aggression hypothesis was based on studies of
the reactions of animals to stressful situations that were
assumed to cause frustration. Typically, these involved the
blockage of immediate and valuable goals (such as
obtaining food or escaping physical pain). In myriad
situations, animals (including humans) reacted to these
frustrations with aggression, such as trying to gain a
particular goal through force (Berkowitz 1989; Miller
1941). Frustration-aggression studies have influenced not
only strain theory, but also more general research on
aggression and violence (e.g., Bernard 1990; Dill and
Anderson 1995; Felson 1992; Moeller 2001).
Second, learned helplessness theory focused on what
happens to animals when there is persistent, uncontrollable
stress in their lives. In these situations, most animals, after
some initial escape attempts, become helpless and avoidant
and appear to accept the situation rather than trying to
escape it. Although the learned helplessness process seems
to work more clearly among animals other than humans, it
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has generated a large body of empirical literature and has
influenced recent studies of whether stressful life events
affect attitudes and behaviors (Hermann 2007; Overmeier
2002; Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1995). Yet it has also
suffered from a general lack of empirical support.
The paucity of empirical support for the ability of the
learned helplessness model to explain human behavior led
to the development of a revised model. It addressed two
limitations of the original model. First, it considered
attributional style (also known as explanatory style): how
people explain the events that they experience. To what
broader forces do they causally attribute the events of their
lives? This is clearly related to externalization of blame.
The second addition to the model involved motivation:
What did an aversive event drive the person towards
(Peterson et al. 1995; Vázquez et al. 2001)? Much of the
research using this revised model has focused on
depression or dysphoria, although there are clearly other
potential outcomes, including aggression, violence, and
various forms of illicit behavior.
Although externalization of blame – or the more
general category of attributional style – has a conceptual
role in GST (Agnew 1992) and revised learned
helplessness models (Peterson et al. 1995), it has generally
been neglected in delinquency research (for important
exceptions, however, see Sykes and Matza [1957] and
Bernard [1990]), even in research on GST. To elaborate
this concept more fully, consider that externalization of
blame involves attributions of whom or what caused the
stressful or anxiety-provoking event. For instance, when an
adolescent’s parents are going through a divorce, does he
blame his father, his mother, or both of them? Does he
blame himself? Or does blame fall on conditions outside
the family’s control? When a student receives a low score
on an exam, does she blame the teacher for making the
questions too difficult, or is blame attributed to poor study
skills, a general lack of intelligence, or not being a skilled
test taker?
Although
some
researchers
have
viewed
externalization of blame as a mediator in the path from
strain to delinquency, it is best envisioned as a moderator.
In other words, according to both GST and socialpsychological depictions of this process, strain tends to
lead to maladaptive behaviors such as delinquency among
those adolescents who blame others for their adversity. But
why should this be so? As discussed later, blaming others
increases the risk of anger and frustration in the face of
strain. Then, as explained by Agnew, these negative
emotions increase the likelihood of delinquency,
aggression, and violent behavior.2 Although this brief
description of the strain process has the value of
parsimony, focusing on attribution of blame necessitates a
much more complex evaluation. We contend that
attribution of blame is actually a much richer concept than
has heretofore been considered in traditional or general
strain theory. Research on attributional styles is

particularly valuable for understanding attributions of
blame and how they affect strain, negative emotions, and
delinquent behavior. Therefore the next section reviews
some of this research to provide a context for our
elaboration of GST.

ATTRIBUTION STYLES
Social-psychological research has identified several
attributional styles. Scholars tend to organize these styles
along three dimensions: internal vs. external, stable vs.
unstable, and local vs. global (Peterson and Seligman
1987; Vázquez et al. 2001; Wise and Rosqvist 2006).
Internal vs. external refers to whether people attribute the
events they experience to factors external to themselves
(other people, random phenomena, fate) or to internal
factors that they have inherited genetically or developed in
their lives (e.g., their native intelligence, skill levels to
perform particular tasks).3 Stable vs. unstable involves
causes that are expected to continue (stable) or those that
are seen as temporary or fleeting (unstable). For example,
a stable causal factor occurs if youths attribute their poor
test taking abilities to a lack of intelligence, whereas an
unstable factor is that they didn’t get enough sleep the
night before the test. Local vs. global concerns whether the
cause is assumed to affect only a single aspect of one’s life
(local), such as taking math tests (e.g., “I’m not good at
math”), or affect aspects of one’s entire life (global), such
as the ability to perform on any test (e.g., “I’m not smart
enough to succeed at written tests”).
According to research on attributions, negative
explanatory styles occur when a person interprets negative
events (e.g., the loss of a job, school failure) as caused by
internal, stable, and global conditions, whereas positive
events are seen as triggered by external, unstable, and local
conditions. A positive explanatory style is the opposite. In
general usage, those who use negative explanatory styles
are labeled pessimists whereas those who use positive
explanatory styles are labeled optimists (Jackson, Sellers,
and Peterson 2002; Wise and Rosqvist 2006). Among
pessimists, bad events are usually understood as being
caused by internal limitations (low intelligence, poor
judgment), are seen as part of broader, stable conditions,
and are thought of as encompassing all aspects of one’s
life. Good events, on the other hand, are attributed to
external conditions (in particular, luck), local (e.g., it will
only happen this one time), and unstable conditions.
A substantial body of research suggests that these
dimensions of causal attribution are consequential for
understanding outcomes such as depression, anxiety, and
school failure. Those who utilize internal, global, and
stable attribution styles to interpret negative events are
likely to experience more negative outcomes, such as
school failure and poor interpersonal relations (Boman,
Smith, and Curtis 2003; Jackson et al. 2002; Peterson and
Seligman 1987; Skinner, Zimmer-Gembeck, and Connell
3
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1998; Vázquez et al. 2001; Wise and Rosqvist 2006). In
addition, people tend to attribute causes most often when
experiencing negative events (Mikula 2003); positive or
neutral events do not as consistently require a causal
explanation when they occur. Thus, we should expect that
these types of events are particularly germane for research
on strain and delinquency.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that external
attributions actually involve distinct phenomena. Much of
the research that has examined this particular dimension
focuses on luck or fate as external causes of negative or
positive events. For example, in an exceptional instance
where attributional styles and criminal behavior have been
examined, Maruna (2004) finds that active offenders tend
to interpret negative events in their lives as the result of
internal, global, and stable conditions. In other words, they
tend to rely on a negative explanatory style. They are also
more likely to believe that the good events in their lives are
the product of external (primarily luck or fate), unstable,
and local causes (see also Rowe, Maughan, and Eley
2006). Nevertheless, studies of offender populations
indicate that the most serious offenders tend to blame their
victims or society for their criminal conduct (e.g.,
Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson 2004, 2007). Thus, it is
important to distinguish whether external attributions
involve luck or fate or whether attributions can be linked
to particular others with whom youths come in contact.4
Unfortunately, most theoretical models and studies of
attributions and criminal conduct have involved asking
offenders about past behaviors. Sykes and Matza’s (1957)
description of the “techniques of neutralization” that
youths use to rationalize their untoward behaviors – and
the research that it motivated – is illustrative of this
inclination: they outlined a series of methods that youths
use to justify their behaviors, especially by denying
responsibility and attributing blame to forces beyond their
control. Yet it is not surprising that many offenders use
post-hoc excuses or neutralization techniques to explain
their illicit behaviors (Maruna 2004; Maruna and Copes
2005; Maruna and Mann 2006). However, these studies do
little to help us understand whether attributions condition
the association between strain and delinquency. It is clear
that we need to address the causal and temporal chain of
events better if we are to gain a full picture of the process
of strain and attribution of blame.5
Moreover, one of the advantages of focusing on
attributional styles is that, as shown in the next section,
they help explain why some youths react with anger, thus
accounting for one of the linchpins of GST. Empirical
research has been mixed concerning the necessity of anger
as a mediator in the strain process (cf. Agnew et al. 2002;
Aseltine et al. 2000; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Tittle et al.
2008), yet this might be because biased attributional styles
have not been considered in studies of GST.6 Without
understanding the attributional tendencies of strained
youths, it is difficult to determine whether anger ensues
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from strain and if anger then affects subsequent delinquent,
aggressive, or violent behaviors. In general, then, we are
concerned in this article with the attributional process –
which is part of the cognitive process youths use to make
sense of their lives and situations – that has been
mentioned by delinquency and strain theorists but has not
been explored sufficiently in conceptual models of strain
theory.

DOES EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTION OF
BLAME MODERATE THE ASSOCIATION
BETWEEN STRAIN AND ANGER?
It is evident from the discussion so far that addressing
external attributions only generally without considering
their constituent elements is not sufficient. In addition to
the distinction between types of external sources (e.g., luck
vs. tangible others), an important issue involves the
argument that attribution is not the same as blame or how
it is focused. Attribution or explanatory style is a general
cognitive orientation that affects all or most aspects of the
way people try to interpret situations and interactions with
others. Blame focuses specifically on culpability; it is
especially likely to evoke a hostile or negative response
when the event is severe, when the person to whom the
event is attributed is present, and when the presumed
victim judges that the perpetrator should have known that
the act is severe (Hall, French, and Marteau 2003; Tennen
and Affleck 1990). This set of conditions has also been
found to enhance aggressive reactions in research based on
the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Berkowitz 1989;
Dill and Anderson 1995). Moreover, when someone
causally interprets negative events as the direct product of
other people’s behaviors – when blame can be attributed
directly to another – the probability of subsequent
aggressive behaviors increases (Fondacaro and Heller
1990; Powell and Rosén 1999). Much of this research has
been based on quasi-experimental designs that provide
stimuli to experimental subjects and then examines their
reactions. Few studies have used survey research or
observational studies in natural settings.
More detailed quasi-experimental studies have shown
that anger tends to emerge especially when blame is
attributed to others (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004;
Bernard 1990; Miller 2001). These studies indicate that
anger is particularly severe when a stressful event is seen
as unjustified and under the control of the provocateur
(Dill and Anderson 1995; Guerra, Huesmann, and Zelli
1993; Mikula 2003). Moreover, displaced aggression
occurs most often when there is more frequent contact
between the provocateur and the person but when the
intensity of the event is lower (Marcus-Newhall et al.,
2000). In general, more intense events – such as those that
threaten actual physical harm or are painful – are likely to
evoke an immediate response, whereas less intense events
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– such as those that seek to make a person feel
uncomfortable or that threaten the removal of a valued
object – allow a presumed victim to be more cautious,
delay the response, and act aggressively against another
target. Hence, anger is a common reaction to certain types
of negative or stressful events, especially those in which
blame may be laid on another person. Interestingly,
aggressive responses to anger can actually improve one’s
subsequent mood (Bushman, Baumeister, and Phillips
2001), thus serving as a coping mechanism (cf. Brezina
1996; Miller 2001).
But why does blaming another rather than blaming,
say, fate, bad luck, or internal limitations tend to lead to
anger and consequent aggressive reactions? Studies
indicate that three specific influences affect this process:
(1) blaming others impedes the use of adaptive coping
strategies, such as problem solving; (2) it causes the
harmed person to dispute positive world views and
perceptions of others; and (3) it makes it more difficult to
draw upon available social support resources since it
negatively affects trust in other people (Hall et al. 2003;
Tennen and Affleck 1990). Moreover, we propose that
externalization of blame is influenced by particular
cognitive biases that are common among aggressive
youths.
In general, then, we reaffirm the claims of Cloward
and Ohlin (1960) and Agnew (1992, 2006a) that strain
becomes channeled toward anger and, consequently,
aggression and delinquent behavior when youths directly
blame others for the negative situations they find
themselves in. Causally attributing blame for negative
situations to others, whether the situations involve a failure
to achieve positively valued goals, the removal of
positively valued stimuli, or the presentation of negative
stimuli, is an important, often essential, condition in the
pathway from strain to anger. Moreover, anger is
particularly likely when the negative event or events are
seen as severe, unjustified, and under the control of a
provocateur or provocateurs; and when the presumed
provocateur or provocateurs are present or in close
proximity (Dill and Anderson 1995; Guerra et al. 1993;
Hall et al. 2003; Mikula 2003; Miller 2001; Tennen and
Affleck 1990). When blame is not causally attributed to
another person or group of persons, anger is much less
likely to result from negative situations. We propose that
under these conditions, other negative or harmful emotions
result, such as dysphoria, anxiety, and depression (Aseltine
et al. 2000; Hoffmann and Su 1998; Kaufman 2009).7

WHY DO SOME YOUTHS EXTERNALIZE
BLAME?
Our elaboration of GST is not complete without
considering why some youths blame others whereas other
youths do not. What mechanism lies at the heart of

external causal attributions? Rather than being an objective
process, we propose that the attributional process involves
how youths interpret events, which may or may not be
objectively accurate. In order to build this argument, we
draw from studies of hostile attribution bias (HAB), which
has emerged from research on how people, especially
children and adolescents, process sensory information.
This is the notion that some children and adolescents are
disproportionately likely to interpret hostile intent on the
part of others during social interactions. They then tend to
generate aggressive responses, which may escalate into
violence (Crick and Dodge 1994; Dodge 2003; Dodge,
Bates, and Pettit 1990; Fondacaro and Heller 1990; Lösel,
Bliesener, and Bender 2007). Although the term attribution
is used to define this condition, research on this topic has
emerged somewhat independently of other social
psychological
research
on
attributional
styles.
Nevertheless, it holds significant promise for
understanding how strain and attributions channel some
youths toward anger, aggression, and delinquency.
Studies of HAB find that these youths attribute hostile
intent during otherwise ambiguous situations, whereas
those without this bias tend to see more benign or
inscrutable intentions on the part of others (Dodge 2003,
2006). In general, they are more likely to “jump to
conclusions” that others have hostile intentions in these
situations and respond with reactive aggression (Hubbard
et al. 2002). Kenneth Dodge (2006) argues that the source
of these biases stems from neurological functioning,
traumatic events in childhood, and a failure to develop
secure attachments with parents and other influential
adults. In particular, children who manifest HAB are
disproportionately likely to have experienced physical and
emotional abuse during childhood (Dodge et al. 1990).
Thus, the link between experiencing abuse and subsequent
delinquent behavior during adolescence is presumed to be
mediated by HAB. Those with HAB also tend to have
mothers who exhibit the same biases (Bickett, Milich, and
Brown 1996) and they demonstrate greater physiological
arousal during ambiguous situations (Hubbard et al. 2002).
Moreover, in an argument reminiscent of Gottfredson
and Hirschi’s (1990) original position on self-control,
Dodge (2006) contends that HAB is a natural condition
that must be socialized out of the individual. Thus, HAB
and self-control are similar concepts, although there are
some important differences. For instance, in a recent
elaboration of the concept of self-control, Hirschi (2004)
argued that it is operationalized best by considering how
potential offenders judge a full range of consequences to
their behaviors. Reminiscent of social bonding theory, he
claimed that those youths who had a higher accumulation
of bonding mechanisms in their lives – or what were
referred to as inhibiting factors – were less likely to
engage in analogous acts of misbehavior (see also Piquero
and Bouffard 2007). HAB is similar in that it is cognitively
oriented and, akin to the judgment aspect of Hirschi’s
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elaboration, it involves how information is processed.
However, HAB is distinct in that its sources are presumed
to be affected profoundly by learning experiences in early
childhood, as well as by traumatic events and neurological
abnormalities that may have a genetic basis.8 This latter
aspect of HAB is especially eschewed by Hirschi (2008).
As far as we have been able to determine, research has
not yet linked HAB to GST, but we propose that it serves
as a core moderating mechanism for explaining why some
youths who experience adverse events or unjust conditions
react with anger and aggression, whereas others take a
more temperate or internalized route. Thus, we argue that
subsequent research on GST should consider whether
youths who experience strain and react with anger also
disproportionately experience attributional biases. (The
next section discusses some ways that HAB might be
considered in research on GST.)
Although we do not claim to provide a complete or
uniform pathway from strain to delinquency, here is an
illustration of how HAB might operate in a GST context.
Suppose a negative event occurs in the life of an
adolescent; perhaps he is failing a class. Rather than
focusing on what he does in this particular situation, we
should consider whether he has a general cognitive
tendency to externalize the negative experiences of his life.
But this will be affected by whether he also manifests
HAB. If, say, he blames the event on his teacher’s poor
treatment of him or lack of skill as an educator (this
evaluation of the teacher may or may not be accurate),
even when others would observe the situation as
ambiguous (his teacher actually treats him fairly but may
react to his bad behavior; his teacher is an accomplished
educator), he gets angry, feels humiliated, or becomes
highly frustrated and takes it out by either disrupting the
classroom or through truancy. He may also demonstrate
displaced aggressive behaviors such as vandalism, truancy,
or fighting with his siblings or with other youths. It is not a
matter of poor coping in the traditional sense or even low
self-control (although this too could be implicated); rather,
the youth’s attribution bias conditions the link between
strain, anger, and delinquency by affecting how he
interprets the adverse events in his life. When ambiguous
or uncontrollable strains are perceived as part of a hostile
environment by those who display biased attributional
styles, their reactions tend to get channeled into anger and
frustration and subsequently toward delinquent and
aggressive conduct.
For those adolescents who do not have biased
attributions that favor hostile interpretations, anger is less
likely and strain tends to be directed towards other
outcomes such as depression, dysphoria, anxiety, and
withdrawal. This may lead to some forms of delinquent
acts, such as drug use, but they do not tend to be
aggressive forms (cf. Bernard 1990). Of course, some
youths may also appear resilient in the face of strain. If
youths have strong relations with parents, conventional
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peers, solid social support networks, or other positive
coping resources, then conventional behaviors likely
ensue. But these are still conditioned by a general
attributional style, with those who fall on the internal side
of the attribution dimension better able to take advantage
of coping mechanisms.
Thus, it is not so much whether some event that is,
perhaps, objectively labeled strain occurs, but how it is
interpreted by the adolescent. The interpretation of events
is acutely influenced by whether the adolescent favors an
external attributional style that identifies other people
rather than fate or luck, manifests hostile attribution bias,
and views the events as unjustified and under the control
of a presumed provocateur.
We also suggest that the link between a need for
autonomy and delinquent behavior may be fruitfully
explained by focusing on attributions of blame and HAB.
Studies have shown that many youths at high risk for
delinquency, including those who experience stressful life
situations, seek to manage situations and engage in
misbehavior to gain a sense of control over their lives
(Agnew 1984; Allen et al. 2002; Brezina 2008; Van Gundy
2002). In terms of GST, we propose that adverse
experiences are particularly germane to those with HAB
because they are generally interpreted negatively and
threaten their sense of control or efficacy. Adolescents
with HAB are especially likely to interpret these
experiences as unjust and arbitrary. When their sense of
autonomy and efficacy is threatened, they may seek
control through hostility and aggression. These types of
reactions help them feel as if they can gain control and
regain their sense of self-efficacy.
Furthermore, attribution biases tend to be selffulfilling. As an adolescent relies on anger and aggression
in the face of strain, this will elicit more presumed
mistreatment by others, which perpetuate and may even
intensify the tendency to externalize blame and attribute
hostile intentions during ambiguous situations. Thus, we
propose that there is a reciprocal mechanism at play here
that should be explored in research on GST.

ASSESSING A MODEL OF HAB, ANGER,
AND STRAIN
Examining the model empirically requires measures of
hostile attribution bias, anger, strain, delinquency, and
other outcomes such as depression and dysphoria. Such
specific data do not generally exist, as far as we have been
able to ascertain.9 One method for examining HAB has
been to provide vignettes to respondents to assess how
they perceive intentions on the part of others (Hubbard et
al. 2002; Lösel et al. 2007; Mikami et al. 2008; Walters
2007). For example, Walters (2007) provided inmates with
vignettes that involved being bumped into or jostled on the
basketball court. Responses fell along a scale that
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included, on one end, that the action was accidental or, on
the other, that it was “definitely deliberate.” Mikami et al.
(2008), following Dodge (1993), similarly provided
vignettes to adolescent girls. They were shown five
hypothetical situations involving various peer experiences
and asked to tell the interviewer why the other girls
behaved as they did. Their responses were then coded as
demonstrating negative/hostile attributions or ambiguous
attributions. Since vignettes have been used successfully in
studies of delinquency and young adult criminal behavior
(e.g., Piquero and Bouffard 2007; Piquero et al. 2004),
they could be adapted for use in a study of HAB, strain,
and delinquency.
As an example that more specifically addresses GST,
Agnew and colleagues (2002) used secondary survey data
(the 1976 National Survey of Children) to analyze
responses to questions about strain, delinquency, and
personality traits.
They
found
that
negative
emotionality/low constraint – which was comprised of
measures of impulsivity, hyperactivity, unhappiness, and
other negative emotions akin to low self-control –
conditioned the association between strain and
delinquency. Similarly, in a study of HAB, anger, strain,
and delinquency, we anticipate that youths who manifest
hostile attributions when presented with vignettes
involving interactions with peers and adults will be more
likely to report a general trait of anger, and this anger will
be channeled into delinquency. Thus, when high levels of
strain are reported, those exhibiting a tendency toward
HAB are especially likely to become angry and report
greater involvement in delinquency. In sum, then, HAB
conditions the association between strain and anger,
consequently affecting the likelihood of delinquent
behaviors.
Experimental research could also be used to measure
HAB, strain, anger, and delinquency among adolescents
(cf. Hubbard et al. 2002). Vignettes are simple to program
into a computer. Youth would be presented with vignettes
and their reactions recorded. They could then be placed in
provocative situations that are designed to test stress and
anger arousal. We anticipate – and this is supported
empirically by laboratory research with children – that
those exhibiting HAB are more likely to react to stressful
situations with anger.
Qualitative studies are also needed to elaborate the
potential role of HAB in strain theory. As discussed by
Agnew (2006b), qualitative studies suggest that
adolescents utilize “storylines” to make sense of their
involvement in delinquent behavior. For instance, one of
these storylines that has direct relevance for GST is when a
youth’s core identity or status is threatened and she blames
another for this perceived negative treatment. Peers often
provide encouragement for an aggressive or violent
response, although exploring the potential role of HAB
through in-depth interviews would provide an additional
context for this type of research. For example, HAB may

increase the likelihood that a youth’s storylines lean
toward a need for vengeance or aggressive reactions to
perceived slights. A carefully approached open-ended
interview by a skilled researcher could provide important
information about whether signs of HAB are present and
how they affect a youth’s perceptions of situations both
real and imagined. Thus, HAB need not simply be another
factor in the positivist tradition of delinquency research;
especially since it has implications for self-identity,
personalized narratives, and symbolic interactionist
notions of how youths perceive reality and their place in
the social order (cf. Matsueda 2006).
However, it is also important that these research
efforts consider the variety of strains that Agnew proposed
are important in GST. Many studies of GST have focused
only on stressful or negative life events rather than a full
course of strains (e.g., Hoffmann and Miller 1998). Studies
should address other strains such as those that elicit
feelings of unjustness (cf. Miller 2001), as well as strains
that gauge the failure to achieve positively valued goals
(cf. Rebellon et al. 2009).

CONCLUSIONS
GST is a promising model of the etiology of
delinquency and crime that has generated dozens of studies
over the last two decades. Agnew and others have
elaborated GST to take into account additional coping
mechanisms,
emotions,
personality
traits,
macrosociological conditions, and adult criminal behavior
(see, generally, Agnew 2006a). However, one core concept
that has been neglected, yet arguably plays a central role in
GST as well as in earlier versions of strain theory, involves
attributions of blame. Known generally as externalization
of blame, several observers have viewed it as the key
moderator in the association between strain and
delinquency. In this paper, we have revisited this concept
and considered it in light of more recent research on
attribution theory.
Our main argument is that the key to understanding
why some youths react to strain with anger whereas others
take an alternate route involves attributional styles. In
particular, youths who react with anger tend to have an
external attributional style that focuses on blaming other
people for their adversity. However, we also contend that
those youths who manifest hostile attribution bias are
particularly likely to assign hostile intentions to others who
they see as the cause of their adversity. When blame can
be channeled directly toward another person or group of
persons by those with these biases, anger is the likely
result. Consequently, for reasons well explicated by
Agnew and others, aggression, delinquency, and violence
tend to ensue. Moreover, such biases and reactions tend to
elicit more presumed negative treatment, which then
exacerbates a tendency to externalize blame and react with
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anger. Thus, there is likely a long-term reciprocal pathway
involved in these associations.
Of course, much more research that explicitly links
attributional styles and biases with GST mechanisms is
needed. As far as we have been able to ascertain, GST
studies have not included measures of attributional style,
HAB, or even tendencies to externalize blame in general. It
is also uncertain whether attributional styles that place
youths at risk of aggression and delinquency may be
overcome by conventional coping resources such as
positive social support or living in an advantaged
neighborhood. Thus, more work is required to determine
whether, as we have argued, attributions are the key
moderating mechanism in GST, in what specific ways
attributions lead to anger in the presence of adverse
conditions, or whether other moderators are as
consequential for explaining the associations among strain,
anger, and delinquency.

Endnotes
1

It is curious to note that attributions of blame in
Agnew’s seminal article were discussed in the context of
Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) research. Yet these scholars
were influenced by Sykes and Matza’s (1957) work on
techniques of neutralization that appeared a few years
earlier. Although Cloward and Ohlin (1960, pp.134-139)
were critical of this neutralization model, they were clearly
taken with the notion that attributions of blame can play a
central role in the process that leads to delinquent
adaptations.
2

Agnew also discussed other pathways that lead from
strain to delinquency, such as when other consequent
emotions (e.g., depression) motivate escapist forms of
behaviors (e.g., drug use). In this paper, however, we focus
on the pathway to delinquency through anger because it
has played such a central role in theoretical and empirical
examinations of GST.
3

The internal vs. external dimension is closest to the
concept of externalization of blame, though there are
subtle differences. For example, externalization of blame is
based on dated research that failed to consider broader
aspects of attributional styles. The internal vs. external
dimension is part of a larger context of how people
interpret events, such as how they attribute causality, the
factors that affect these attributions, and the likely
outcomes that are determined, in part, by these processes.
4

A related area of research that we do not explore, but
likely has implications for research on attributions and
delinquency, involves locus of control. This concept refers
to the tendency of individuals to attribute events to forces
in their control or outside of their control. People who
think that they control the forces that affect their lives have
an internal locus of control, whereas those who see mostly
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the effects of luck or the influence of powerful others on
their life course have an external locus of control (Twenge
2007; Twenge, Zhange, and Im 2004). Studies have
consistently found that people who manifest external locus
of control tend to have problems with depression, anxiety,
school failure, self-control, and other negative life course
outcomes (Chorpita and Barlow 1998; Kliewer and
Sandler 1992). Moreover, some research suggests that
external locus of control is associated with conduct
disorder, aggressiveness, and delinquent behavior
(Hindelang 1973; Liu et al. 2000; Peiser and Heaven 1996;
Powell and Rosén 1999). Research on locus of control has
rarely been linked explicitly to attribution theory or any
form of strain theory, though; thus it falls outside the
domain of this paper.
5

Another oversight that is as problematic as failing to
consider this causal and temporal chain of events is the
emphasis on a positivistic research agenda to conduct these
studies. As described later, there is promise in symbolic
interactionist based research approaches for understanding
attributions and behaviors (cf. Agnew 2006b). For
example, linking identity theory, attributional inclinations,
strain, and delinquency requires a research agenda that is
open to narrative analysis based on in-depth, open-ended
interviews and observational protocols. This obviously
challenges the use of terms such as “causal attributions”
since these approaches tend to subvert attention to
“causality,” yet they may also be more appropriate to
examining the subtleties of understanding delinquent
behavior.
6

A reviewer of an early draft of this paper commented
that Agnew et a1. (2002) did not focus on anger, but rather
addressed the conditioning effect of negative emotionality
on the association between strain and delinquency. They
found that strain is associated most strongly with
delinquency among youths who exhibit negative
emotionality/low
constraint.
However,
negative
emotionality/low constraint is measured by traits such as
impulsivity, hyperactivity, bad temper, argumentative, and
unhappiness. Some of these traits have been used to
measure low self-control and anger, thus obfuscating the
particular personality dimension of concern in studies of
GST (cf. Hirschi 2004). Our goal is to show that another
type of trait – which involves whether youths externalize
blame and among whom this tends to occur – is
particularly important for elaborations of strain theory.
7

Research has also found that depression and
delinquency are not independent phenomena; there is
substantial co-occurrence of these two conditions among
adolescents (e.g., Hagan and Foster 2003; Kaufman 2009).
Thus, we do not argue that the pathway from strain to
delinquency is uniform or independent of negative
conditions such as depressive symptoms; rather, we
propose that the association between strain, anger, and
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delinquency is conditioned by external attributions of
blame that involve tangible others.
8

Research with primates suggests that getting angry
when situations are interpreted as unfair is a typical
reaction. Evolutionary psychologists have used this and
other evidence to argue that animals, including humans,
are “hard-wired” to react to unfair or harmful behavior on
the part of others with negative emotions such as anger and
anxiety (see Horne [2009] for a concise review of this
idea). Thus, it is likely that overcoming – or at least
reigning in – such neurological tendencies requires some
conventional socializing mechanism; without adequate
socialization, perhaps HAB is the natural outcome (Dodge
2006). In a related line of research, children with HAB
tend to have greater physiological arousal during stressful
interactions, with the stereotypical “hot-headed” reactive
aggression ensuing (Hubbard et al. 2002).
9

and Delinquency: Extending General Strain Theory.”
Criminology 40:43-71.
Agnew, Robert and Helene Raskin White. 1992. “An
Empirical Test of General Strain Theory.”
Criminology 30:475-499.
Allen, Joseph P., Penny Marsh, Christy McFarland,
Kathleen Boykin McElhaney, and Deborah J. Land.
2002. “Attachment and Autonomy as Predictors of the
Development of Social Skills and Delinquency during
Midadolescence.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 70:56-66.
Aseltine, Robert H., Susan Gore, and Jennifer Gordon.
2000. “Life Stress, Anger and Anxiety, and
Delinquency: An Empirical Test of General Strain
Theory.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior
41:256-275.

Although it would be our preference to test the
model we have outlined, the lack of data available that are
appropriate for such a test make it impossible to provide an
empirical examination in this paper. Moreover, as we
suggest later, there are actually several distinct research
approaches that are available to test the model. We offer
these as an early roadmap to other researchers who may
wish to examine HAB’s role in GST.
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